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Abstract
Bank Bailout Menus
We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have private
information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment opportunities.
Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Worse bank types choose larger
bailouts. Constrained-optimality involves overcapitalization of banks and nonlinear pricing
(e.g. the bailout agency receives proportionally more shares in larger bailouts). Equity
injections and asset buyouts are equivalent when new investments follow the assets. The
larger capital outlay involved in asset buyouts can be offset by borrowing against the assets.
If investments follow the bank, equity injections offer more upside to the bailout agency
than asset buyouts. But upside can damage as well as enhance efficiency, depending on
whether screening intensity is needed mostly on assets-in-place or new investments.
Keywords: Bailouts, Equity injections, Asset buyouts, Subsidies, Debt overhang, Private
information, Self-selection, Screening, Constrained-optimality.
JEL: G28, G01, D82
1 Introduction
The recent spate of banking crises, arising in part from “unanticipated” declines in the
quality of mortgage-backed loans and securities in US markets in particular, has brought
to the fore issues of optimal mechanisms for restoring banks to well-functioning entities
capable of further lending to the real sector of an economy. Banks are characterized not
only by their specialized role as relationship-based lenders with hard-to-replace informa-
tional advantages vis-a-vis small and medium sized firms, they are also often funded with
high leverage from dispersed creditors, be they depositors with demandable claims or (in-
creasingly) wholesale market lenders with short-term claims which may not be refinanced.
These features of bank liabilities make it extremely difficult to renegotiate their debt – to
a combination of debt reduction and equity-like claims for example – directly with their
creditors, and hence governments often play a direct role in ameliorating the problems
arising from banks having a large degree of “debt overhang” – a surfeit of future fixed
claims relative to potential future values of their extant assets in adverse scenarios.
As Myers (1977) recognized in a path-breaking paper, this gives rise to underinvest-
ment by equityholders, or management acting in their interest, since much of any future
cash flows generated by such investments could accrue to extant creditors, while the costs
of investments would be borne by existing equityholders – either directly, or via a reduc-
tion in their future payoffs arising from additional promised repayments to new financiers
whose claims would typically be junior to those of existing creditors. With voluntary par-
ticipation, a policy of injecting funds into such banks in order to improve their incentives
to invest and lend must take into account that existing equityholders have an option value
that arises from the expectation of profits after repaying their creditors in the upper tail
of the distributions of their future asset values.
In this paper, we investigate the properties of two often-used mechanisms for provid-
ing such cash injections to troubled banks, namely Equity Injections in return for the
government acquiring a partial share of a bank’s equity capital, and Asset Buyouts (or,
asset buybacks) whereby the government injects cash into a bank in return for acquiring
ownership of a subset, or fraction, of its (troubled) assets. We do so in a setting in which
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bank managements, who we assume to be acting in the interests of their shareholders,
are privately informed about the qualities of their illiquid and risky troubled assets and
new investments. As a clear consequence of such asymmetric information, fund injection
mechanisms to alleviate debt overhang must be carefully designed, so as not to leave too
much surplus for banks’ current equityholders, relative to the status quo values of their
claims in the absence of alleviating debt overhang related problems.
Not surprisingly, given the enormity of the scales of recent fund injections, or Bailouts,
of especially larger banks with significant holdings of “toxic” assets, these issues have
received much attention in policy-related debates as well as in the emerging academic
literature. In the former sphere, policy makers have vacillated, regarding massive asset
buyout programs such as TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) in the US, much of the
budgeted resources for which were later switched to equity injections as with Citibank,
for example. Bebchuk (2008) provides a summary of considerations involved in evaluating
asset qualities and their likely equilibrium valuations for such buyout programs; Schaefer
and Zimmermann (2009) consider a related set of issues for bank recapitalization, coupled
with creation of “bad banks” to manage assets acquired by the bailout agency.
In a more detailed analytical vein, Landier and Ueda (2008), as well as Philippon and
Schnabl (2011), have discussed the relative merits of some alternative bailout mechanisms
that have been considered. Landier and Ueda consider an asymmetric information envi-
ronment in which banks have private information about their default risks, but there is no
issue of their incentives to invest in new assets. They conclude that an efficient mechanism
for bailing out banks from defaulting is to provide an ex post guarantee to their creditors,
to pay them the difference between the face values of their claims and what their debtor
bank can repay in an adverse future state. In our context, featuring an investment disin-
centive problem arising from debt overhang, such a purely ex post debt guarantee would
do nothing to resolve the problem. The reason is that, when a debtor bank would invest,
much of any additional cash flows generated by such investment would accrue to their
extant creditors in the adverse future states, and hence serve to reduce the value of any
guarantee from the perspective of the bank’s equityholders who would bear (directly or
indirectly) the cost associated with the investment. That is the case since, by assumption,
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cash flows arising within the bank from new investments can not be distinguished – neither
by their creditors, nor by their debt guarantor – from those accruing from the old assets
in place.
Philippon and Schnabl (2011), on the other hand, do analyze a fully fledged debt
overhang environment with asymmetric information as above, in which the resulting dis-
incentive to invest is of concern. Another concern of theirs is opportunistic participation,
whereby banks that do not need bailouts choose to participate in the program because of
the financial subsidies it provides. Comparing equity injections and asset buyouts, they
conclude that equity injections dominate. Their reasoning is that because equity injections
allow the bailout agency to share in the upside of new investments, they reduce oppor-
tunistic program participation by banks that do not need the bailout and thus reduce the
aggregate cost of the scheme. Our approach and conclusions are different.
We make use a basic insight from the screening literature that efficiency may be im-
proved through the use ofmenus of contracts (e.g. Stiglitz 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976,
Wilson 1977). Thus, we allow the bailout agency to offer a menu of plans, each item in
the menu being tailored for a particular type (of bank quality), taking into account the
incentive compatibility constraint that a bank will choose the plan that maximizes value
to its extant shareholders. In contrast, Philippon and Schnabl allow the bailout agency
to only offer a single contract.1 We show, with returns to assets-in-place ordered by first
order stochastic dominance, that constrained-optimality can be achieved by a single plan
when there are only two types. With S ≥ 2 types, S − 1 plans are needed.2 Constrained-
optimality involves nonlinear pricing; the larger the injection, the smaller the price per
unit being sold (shares of equity or assets). Worse banks require larger injections and
thus the plans involving larger injections are tailored for them. But this also means that
larger injections must involve smaller prices per unit, because of participation constraints
1We also allow for more heterogeneity across banks in the returns to assets-in-place and new invest-
ments, and our menu approach means the bailout agency does not need to have full knowledge of the joint
distribution of returns across types.
2By constrained-optimality here, we mean that all positive NPV investments are made (i.e., bailouts
solve banks’ debt overhang problems) and net subsidies to existing claimants are minimized, subject to
voluntary participation.
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– banks’ shareholders must do at least as well with a bailout as without.
We also show that a feature of constrained-optimal plans is that they require overcap-
italization. This is so as to make it unattractive for better quality banks to choose the
plans intended for lower quality banks. A high level of dilution at a low price per share
is not a good deal for high quality banks. Types that do not need a bailout or have no
positive NPV investments can be deterred from participating in the bailout scheme simply
by not including plans in the menu that are favorable to them.
With respect to comparing asset buyouts and equity injections, we derive an equiva-
lence result; namely that a constrained-optimal menu of equity injections can be replicated
by a menu of asset buyouts. This holds under the assumption that new investment oppor-
tunities follow the assets. That is, a bank’s future investment opportunities are reduced in
proportion to the assets it sells, with the lost opportunities going to the buyer of the assets.
In this scenario, there is no difference with respect to the upside from new investments
the bailout agency obtains in an equity injection or an asset buyout, which also provides
intuition for our equivalence result.
If investments follow the bank (interim investment opportunities are not affected by
the sale of assets-in-place), equity injections offer more participation in new investments
to the bailout agency than asset buyouts. We show by way of an example that this can
damage as well as enhance efficiency, depending on whether screening intensity is needed
mostly on assets-in-place, which favors asset buyouts, or new investments, which favors
equity injections.
In general, the initial cash outlay for the bailout agency in an equity injection is smaller
than in an asset buyout. Subsequent outlays relating to future investments may be equal,
as in our baseline model, or, if not, can potentially be avoided by selling equity or assets
before the investment is to be made. Under the belief that raising bailout funds involves
social costs, for example because taxes need to be increased and/or other valuable spending
gets crowded out, one may be tempted to conclude that the smaller initial outlay favors
equity injections. However, the fundamental reason equity injections are smaller is that
they have implicit leverage. If the bailout agency can borrow against the assets it buys
in an asset buyout, it can achieve the same, relatively low need for public funds as under
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an equity injection.3 Thus, if the bailout agency can raise funds on fair terms in the
market, the larger size of asset buyouts is not in and of itself a drawback. In our baseline
model, where equity injections and asset buyouts result in the same level of subsidies, this
observation leads us to a simple Miller-Modigliani style irrelevance result, even if there are
social costs associated with using public money to bail out banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the notation for
our space of bank types, their return distributions, and two main bailout programs. The
main analysis is carried out in Section 3, with general extensions considered in Section 4.
Section 5 considers issues that address more specifically the optimality of equity injections
versus asset buyouts. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains all proofs that are not
provided in the text.
2 The Model
The model addresses the problem as to how to restructure a “weak” bank’s balance sheet
in preparation for its return to normal banking activities, including raising fresh capital.
In the absence of a bailout, a debt overhang problem prevents the bank from raising new
capital. The bailout that is needed to overcome the debt overhang problem must take
place ex ante, since it is assumed that there will not be sufficient time to do a bailout the
instant investment (lending) opportunities arrive. The notion that the bailout process is
slow while investment opportunities can be fleeting echoes Huberman (1984).4
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. A central agency (a government with powers of
taxation) is considering bailing out banks at date 0. Banks initially have assets-in-place,
3Enhancing bailout funds through leverage is a feature of The European Financial Stability Fund
(EFSF), which is authorized to borrow on the market to increase funds available for financial assistance to
euro area member states (European Financial Stability Fund, European Sovereign Bond Protection Facil-
ity Launched, 17 February 2012, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/mediacentre/news/2012/2012-05-european-
sovereign-bond-protection-facility-launched.htm).
4Huberman develops a model of external financing and liquidity in which there is not sufficient time to
raise funds once an investment opportunity arises. It has to be raised in advance. We only assume that
there is not sufficient time to do a bailout.
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which pay off at date 2 according to two-point distributions that depend on a bank’s
type. The NPV of new investment (lending) opportunities, which arrive at the interim
date (time 1), also depends on a bank’s type. Only a bank’s management knows its type
and the management’s objective is to maximizes the value of existing shareholders’ equity.
There is universal risk neutrality and the riskfree rate is 0.
Banks are indexed by s ∈ S = {1, . . . , S}. The assets-in-place of a bank of type s
either returns Hs (state w = H; the “up-state”), with probability ps, or Ls < Hs (state
w = L; the “down-state.”) Thus, the date 0 full information value of the assets-in-place
of a bank of type s is
As = psHs + (1− ps)Ls. (1)
Each bank can be viewed as having separate up and down states. No assumption is made
regarding any inter-dependence between different banks’ up and down states. However,
it is assumed that Hs and Ls are (weakly) increasing in s, while ps is strictly increasing.
Thus, the quality of a bank is increasing in s, in the sense that the distribution of future
returns from the assets-in-place of a bank of type s first order stochastically dominates
that of a bank of type s′ < s. Moreover, As is increasing in s.
The interim investment costs I and returns X˜s + I at date 2, where X˜s is a random
variable. Let Xs = E[X˜s], where E[·] is the expectations operator. Thus Xs represents
the NPV of the investment opportunity. This is also assumed to be (weakly) increasing in
s. So banks with better assets-in-place also have better investment opportunities, perhaps
reflecting managerial skill or positive synergies between assets-in-place and investment
opportunities. Let Xmins denote the greatest lower bound of the distribution of future
returns from the new investment net of I .5
Banks have only two types of claims outstanding, senior debt (including deposits)
and common stock. All debt matures at date 2. The promised payment, F , on debt is
independent of bank type, which is meant as a scale normalization. We assume:
A1. Ls + I +X
min
s ≥ F for all s
5Xmins could for example be the realization of X˜s in the down-state of the assets-in-place. However,
we do not require X˜s to be contingent on the state ws or to have a two-point distribution.
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and
A2. Ls < F < Hs for all s.
A1 says that if the interim investment is taken, creditors will be paid off in full regardless
of which state occurs at date 2. A2 says that the debt is risky without the new investment
or a capital injection. It also sets up the potential for a debt overhang problem, since it
implies a wealth transfer to creditors if the interim investment is made. By A1, at date 1
the expected wealth transfer is (1 − ps)(F − Ls).
6 Thus, to generate a debt overhang
problem for all types, we also assume that
A3. 0 < Xs < (1− ps)(F − Ls) for all s.
Given A3, equityholders will not finance a positive NPV project because the transfer to
creditors exceeds the NPV. This debt overhang problem motivates bailouts.7
A bailout plan is a pair of two-tuples
B = ((φ, C), (λ,E)) ∈ ([0, 1]× [0,∞))× ([0, 1]× [0,∞))
that describe an asset buyout and an equity injection, respectively. φ ∈ [0, 1] is the
fraction of assets that are bought and C ≥ 0 is the total amount that is paid for these
assets. λ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of all shares the bailout agency obtains if it injects E ≥ 0
in fresh equity capital. After a bailout, B, the asset value at date 2 excluding payoffs of
new investments, if any, for w = H,L is
wBs = (1− φ)ws + C + E. (2)
This assumes that: (i) The stochastic rates of return on a banks’ remaining assets after a
partial sale remain the same as that on its assets as a whole, and (ii) all cash injections
are initially invested in the riskfree asset. We also assume that (iii) interim investments
follow the assets rather than the bank itself. That is, the scale of interim investments
available to the bank is proportional to the assets kept on the bank’s books; available new
6A1 thus allows us to capture the key idea of debt overhang that new investments involve wealth
transfers to creditors in the simplest possible way.
7Bailouts could also be motivated by a desire to shore up a bank’s balance sheet in order to prevent a
run and the social costs that would involve. Social costs and benefits from a bailout will be considered in
Section 4, where we also relax A3.
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investments cost (1− φ)I and return (1− φ)(X˜s + I). The “lost” investment opportunity
accrues to the buyer of the assets. In Section 5.2 we consider an alternative setup where
a bank’s investment opportunities are not reduced when assets are sold.
If the investment is not taken, the date 2 (realized) payoff to date 1 equityholders net
of interim investment costs is max[wBs − F, 0]. If it is taken, this becomes max[w
B
s + (1−
φ)(X˜s+ I)−F, 0]− (1−φ)I . Let 1invest|B,s be an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if
the interim investment is made and 0 if not (given bailout plan B and type s). We have
1invest|B,s = 1 iff E
[
max[wBs + (1− φ)(X˜s + I)− F, 0]
]
−(1−φ)I ≥ E
[
max[wBs − F, 0]
]
,
(3)
where the expectation on the left hand side is taken over the joint distribution of ws and
X˜s, while on the right hand side it is taken over the marginal distribution of ws.
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The expected net payoff to the original shareholders of a bank of type s under bailout
plan B is thus
ZBs = (1−λ)
(
E
[
max[wBs + (1− φ)(X˜s + I)1invest|B,s − F, 0]
]
− (1− φ)I × 1invest|B,s
)
.
(4)
If there is no bailout, payoffs to equity and creditors are equivalent to those under the
“null plan”, B0 ≡ ((φ = 0, C = 0), (λ = 0, E = 0)), where by A3 the interim investment
does not take place.
A necessary condition for the bank to accept the plan is that old shareholders are no
worse off with the plan than without, that is,
ZBs ≥ Z
B0
s = ps(Hs − F ). (5)
Let B be a collection, or menu, of bailout plans and let Bs ∈ B satisfy
9
Bs = arg max B∈BZ
B
s . (6)
In other words, for any menu of bailout plans, the best plan for the existing shareholders of
a bank of type s is denoted Bs. The dependence of Bs on a given menu, B, is suppressed
8The condition for investing can also be written as (1− φ)Xs weakly exceeding the wealth transfer to
creditors (the difference in the value of the debt with and without the investment).
9If for a given s there are multiple plans that satisfy (6), Bs can be picked arbitrarily among them.
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in the notation, for ease of reading. We write
Bs = ((φs, Cs), (λs, Es)). (7)
Bailouts may involve a private loss to the agency because of the participation constraint
(5) and because of a positive wealth transfer (subsidy) to creditors, as described above.
The bailout agency seeks to choose a menu of bailout plans to incentivize banks to take
all positive NPV investments, while minimizing its own loss. Put differently, the bailout
agency’s objective is to maximize social surplus while keeping as much as possible of the
increase in surplus brought about by bailouts in public hands. This can be motivated for
example by political pressure, or moral hazard concerns, not to reward bad past perfor-
mance. It is also equivalent to saying that the bailout agency seeks to maximize its own
expected profit from the bailout program, subject to banks making efficient investment
decisions and voluntary participation.
More precisely, the bailout agency’s objective is to choose a menu B to minimize
∑
S
qs


Cs − φs[psHs + (1− ps)Ls +Xs]︸ ︷︷ ︸
net subsidy from asset buyout
+ Es −
λ
1− λ
ZBss︸ ︷︷ ︸
net subsidy from equity injection


(8)
subject to (6), (5), and10
1invest|Bs,s = 1 for all s, (9)
and where qs is the prior (unconditional) probability that a bank is of type s. Constraint
(6) means that each bank chooses the plan in the menu that maximizes the wealth of its
existing shareholders. Constraint (5) means that doing so leaves the existing shareholders
as least as well off as without a bailout. Constraint (9) says that under the best plan, Bs,
for a bank of type s, debt overhang is eliminated (the interim investment is made). By
A1, the subsidy to creditors is fixed when the investment is taken (at (1− ps)(F −Ls) for
10By A3, Xs > 0 for all s. Maximization of surplus therefore implies 1invest|Bs,s = 1 for all s. In
Section 4, we allow for the possibility thatXs may be nonpositive. In this case, the participation constraint,
(5), will change to a non-participation constraint when Xs ≤ 0 (or 1invest|Bs,s = 0).
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each s) and we can write the minimization problem as
min
B
∑
S
qsZ
Bs
s (10)
subject to the same constraints, (6), (5), and (9).
We define a constrained-optimal menu of bailout plans to be such that the above pro-
gram is solved with the participation constraint, (5), being binding. In other words, a
constrained-optimal menu achieves efficient investment levels with zero windfall to equi-
tyholders. Since the subsidy to creditors is fixed when interim investments are taken, a
constrained-optimal menu implements efficient investment while keeping total subsidies at
the lowest theoretical possibility, given voluntary bailout participation and no expropria-
tion of assets or claims.
3 Analysis
The main focus of our analysis lies in identifying constrained-optimal bailout plans. We
show how to construct them and in the process establish existence results, describe the
explicit form they take, and derive their key characteristics. We also compare and contrast
equity injections with asset bailouts.
Define
Lˆs ≡ Ls +
Xs
1− ps
and Eˆs ≡ F − Lˆs. (11)
Lemma 1 Under a pure equity injection, debt overhang is eliminated if and only if E ≥
Eˆs.
This is intuitive. It is simply a rewriting of the observation that to overcome the debt
overhang problem, the capital injection from the bailout must be large enough that the
NPV exceeds the expected transfer to creditors. Eˆs is thus the minimum equity injection
needed for bank s to make the interim investment. This is strictly decreasing in s, i.e.,
worse types need larger injections to overcome the debt overhang.
We continue with another observation, from which we can deduce an irrelevance result
with respect to equity injections versus asset buyouts.
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Lemma 2 There is a one-to-one mapping with respect to payoffs to (old) equityholders
between equity injection and asset buyout bailout plans. In particular, the pure equity
injection plan (λ,E) and the pure asset buyout plan (φ, C) result in the same interim
investment decision and the same state-by-state payoff to (old) equityholders provided that
φ = λ and C = (1− λ)E + λF .
This has two immediate and important implications. First, the set of payoffs to old
equityholders induced by a menu of equity injection plans can be replicated with a menu
of asset buyout plans (and vice versa). Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints that
arise from a menu of equity injections can be replicated with a menu of asset buyouts.
Second, for an equity injection plan that solves the debt overhang problem for a bank
of type s, there is a corresponding asset buyout plan that gives the same state-by-state
payoffs to all claimholders and the bailout agency (and vice versa). As a corollary of these
two observations, we have
Proposition 1 If there is a menu of pure equity injection plans that yields constrained-
optimality, then there is also a menu of pure asset buyout plans that does so (and vice
versa). One can go from one to the other by applying the mapping in Lemma 2.
If constrained-optimality can be achieved by a menu of pure equity injection or asset buyout
plans, then it can also be achieved by a menu of mixed plans (being convex combinations of
the pure equity and asset buyout plans that achieve constrained-optimality). Furthermore
and importantly, Lemma 2 also implies that for any mixed plan there is an equity injection
plan that gives the same payoff to old equityholders. Thus, if there is a menu of mixed
plans that achieve constrained-optimality, there is also a set of pure equity plans that
does so. In short, in terms of finding conditions under which constrained-optimality can
be achieved, it suffices to study pure equity injection plans. We have therefore chosen to
cast our analysis in terms of these. However, below we also compare the characteristics
of constrained-optimal equity injection plans to their corresponding constrained-optimal
asset buyout plans.
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3.1 Constrained-Optimal Menus
Our focus is on a scenario where there can be downside heterogeneity, i.e., Ls varies across
types, but upside homogeneity, i.e.
A4. Hs = H for all s.
This can be motivated by thinking of the assets held by the bank as loans, whose future
values have a fixed upper bound equal to the promised repayments of the loans. Further-
more, the up-state can be thought of as representing a benign macroeconomic environment
where a bank’s portfolio of loans performs in an actuarially predictable manner; there is
minimal uncertainty with respect to the fraction of loans that default and the correspond-
ing writedowns, and there is a well-functioning liquid secondary market (possibly through
the process of securitization) for loans that have not yet matured. The down-state can
be thought of as a negatively shocked economy where asset values and market liquidity
are reduced. In the down-state, default probabilities, writedowns, and the extent to which
there is a secondary market for loans will thus depend to a larger extent on individual loan
characteristics. In other words, a shocked economy amplifies underlying differences in the
quality of loan portfolios as compared with when the economy is in a benign state. Thus,
banks’ private information about the characteristics of their assets (loan portfolios) mat-
ters especially when the economy is shocked. Our assumption of downside heterogeneity
but upside homogeneity captures this asymmetry.
We solve for constrained-optimal menus by first finding the share-cash indifference
curves that leave equityholders indifferent between a bailout and the status quo. Using
Lemma 1, the indifference curve for bank s is given by the locus of λ’s and E’s that satisfy
ps(H − F ) =


(1− λ)ps(H + E − F ) if E < Eˆs
(1− λ)
[
ps(H + E − F ) + (1− ps)(Lˆs + E − F )
]
if E ≥ Eˆs
(12)
Thus, the indifference curve can be written
λs(E) =


1− H−F
H+E−F
if E < Eˆs
1− ps(H−F )
ps(H+E−F )+(1−ps)(Lˆs+E−F )
if E ≥ Eˆs.
(13)
The properties of these indifference curves and the way they shift as s changes are key to
characterizing constrained-optimal menus. An illustration is provided by Figure 1.
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 shows the curves for two types described by H = 120, F = 100, Lˆ1 = 80,
Lˆ2 = 90, p1 = 0.5, and p2 = 2/3. Observe first that the two indifference curves coincide as
long as E is too small to solve the debt overhang problem for either type, i.e., E ≤ Eˆ2 = 10.
However, as E becomes larger than Eˆ2, the curve for the higher type (s = 2) moves above
that for the lower type. This “uplift” arises when the equity injection is so large that
equity shares in the payoff in the low state. It also reflects the additional value from
the interim investment. As E becomes larger than Eˆ1, the curve for the lower type also
changes functional form. Its slope increases and exceeds that of the curve of the higher
type, since an extra dollar of injections now contributes relatively more to the equity value
of the lower (and less valuable) type. The greater slope of the indifference curve of the
lower curve eventually allows it to cross the curve of the higher type at (λ = 2/3, E = 30).
That such an intersection point exists is intuitive as it simply means that as E increases,
the total contribution to equity eventually becomes larger for the less valuable type. This
intersection point is unique (for E ≥ Eˆ2). With a single bailout plan defined by this
intersection point, debt overhang is solved for both types, and by construction of the
indifference curves, the minimal level of subsidy to existing claimholders is obtained. In
other words, in our example, one constrained-optimal menu simply exists of the single
bailout plan, (λ = 2/3, E = 30).
The result illustrated in Figure 1, that there is a unique plan that satisfies constrained-
optimality for s = 1, 2, is general. Define
Aˆs ≡ psH + (1− ps)Lˆs. (14)
Proposition 2 Suppose a bank is one of two types, s = 1, 2, where Lˆ1 < Lˆ2, Hs = H,
p1 < p2.
11 There is a unique pure equity injection bailout plan, BE(1, 2) = (λ
(1,2), E(1,2)),
that for both banks resolves debt overhang and achieves the minimal subsidy. The bailout
plan is given by:
11Lˆ1 < Lˆ2 results when L1 ≤ L2, X1 ≤ X2, and p1 < p2.
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λ(1,2) =
(H − F )(p2 − p1)
p2H + (1− p2)Lˆ2 − (p1H + (1− p1)Lˆ1)
= 1−
(H − F )(p2 − p1)
Aˆ2 − Aˆ1
(15)
and
E(1,2) = F −
p2
(
Hp1 + Lˆ1 (1− p1)
)
− p1
(
Hp2 + Lˆ2 (1− p2)
)
p2 − p1
= F −
p2Aˆ1 − p1Aˆ2
p2 − p1
. (16)
Under this plan, both banks are overcapitalized: The equity injection is strictly greater than
the minimum needed to overcome debt overhang fully, that is E(1,2) > Eˆ1 > Eˆ2.
The bailout plan BE(1, 2) = (λ
(1,2), E(1,2)) represents the unique intersection point (for
E ≥ Eˆ2) of the two types’ indifference curves, e.g., the point (λ = 2/3, E = 30) in Figure 1.
The subsidy minimizing debt relief program can also be implemented with a menu of two
bailout plans, which can be chosen so as to ensure separation between the two types. Any
menu ((λ1, E1), (λ2, E2)) satisfying the following conditions will do: (i) (λi, Ei) is on the
indifference curve of type i; (ii) E2 ∈ (Eˆ2, E
(1,2)); and (iii) E1 > E
(1,2), where E(1,2) is
given by (16).
The common feature of all constrained-optimal bailout menus is that the low type must
be overcapitalized so as to ensure that the high type is not oversubsidized. This is evident
in the example in Figure 1. Strict separation between the two types while keeping old
equity to its status quo payoff implies that the plan tailored for Type 1 must be on this
type’s indifference curve with an E to the right of the intersection point, i.e. E1 > 30; while
the plan tailored for Type 2 must be on this type’s indifference curve with E2 ∈ (10, 30).
In contrast, just resolving debt overhang requires injections of 20 and 10 for types 1 and 2,
respectively.
When there are more than two types, we can calculate the unique intersection points,
as above, for each pair. To achieve constrained-optimality, we need monotonicity of the
intersection points, in the following sense:
Definition 1 (Monotonicity of indifference curve intersection points)
Suppose there are S ≥ 3 bank types and for each type s > 1 let (λ(s−1,s), E(s−1,s)) be the
intersection point of the share-cash indifference curves of bank types s−1 and s, as defined
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by (15) and (16).12 These S − 1 intersection points are monotonic if E(s−1,s) ≤ E(t−1,t)
whenever s > t.
The intersection points referred to here represent the unique constrained-optimal com-
mon equity injection bailout plans for two adjacent bank types, as given in Proposition 2.
Intersection point monotonicity is necessary to ensure constrained-optimality. A graph-
ical illustration of intersection point monotonicity and its importance for constrained-
optimality is provided in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 depicts the indifference curves of three types, s = 1, 2, 3, with p1 < p2 < p3,
and Lˆ1 < Lˆ2 < Lˆ3. The red, blue, and green lines are the curves for types 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Focusing on the segments of these curves after they no longer coincide, we
see that the green (type 3) and blue (type 2) curves intersect at a smaller E than does the
blue and red (type 1) curves. This is intersection point monotonicity.
As a result of intersection point monotonicity, there is also indifference curve mono-
tonicity with respect to which type has the maximum λ for a given equity injection.
Specifically, we see in Figure 2 that for low E, type 3 is willing to give away a larger share
of the equity than types 2 and 1. For intermediate E’s, type 2 is willing to give away
a larger λ than the other two types. And for high E’s, type 1 is willing to give away a
larger share. Thus, it is possible to design a menu of three bailout plans that achieves
constrained-optimality by offering: (i) a plan with a low E and a λ that falls on the in-
difference curve of type 3; (ii) a plan with an intermediate E and a λ that falls on the
indifference curve of type 2; (iii) a plan with a high E and a λ that falls on the indifference
curve of type 1.13 Constrained-optimality can also be achieved with the two plans defined
by the two intersection points (of the indifference curves of types 1 and 2 and then again
of types 2 and 3). If intersection point monotonicity does not hold, such constructions are
not possible and obtaining constrained-optimality would not be feasible.
12Substitute s for 2 and s− 1 for 1 in these equations.
13“Low” E means E ∈ [Eˆ3, E
(2,3)); “intermediate” E means E ∈ [E(2,3), E(1,2)); and “high” E means
E ≥ E(1,2)
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Theorem 1 Suppose Lˆs and ps are strictly increasing in s, and Hs = H for all s. A
menu of equity injection plans that (a) achieves full relief of debt overhang for each bank
type, s = 1, . . . , S and (b) provides the equityholders of each type with an expected payoff
equal to the pre-bailout level, exists if and only if the indifference curve intersection points
are monotonic, which holds if and only if
ps+1(1− ps)Lˆs − ps(1− ps+1)Lˆs+1
ps(1− ps−1)Lˆs−1 − ps−1(1− ps)Lˆs
>
ps+1 − ps
ps − ps−1
(17)
for s = 2, . . . , S − 1.
With more than two types, it is intuitive that the construction of a constrained-optimal
menu is not possible if two or more of the types are “too close.” Condition (17) makes
this notion of “closeness” precise. Note that using the mapping from equity injections to
equivalent asset buyouts described in Lemma 2, any optimal menu of equity injections can
be replicated with a corresponding menu of asset buyouts.
We now turn to discussing the key characteristics of constrained-optimal bailout plans
implied by the analysis above. We are especially interested in the pricing scheme implied
by a constrained-optimal menu. Normalizing the number of initial shares to 1, the number
of new shares under a pure equity injection plan is λ/(1 − λ). Thus, the price per new
share is E(1−λ)/λ. Under an asset buyout plan, the price per 100% of the assets is simply
C/φ.
Proposition 3 (Characteristics of constrained-optimal bailouts)
Consider constrained-optimal menus of either pure equity or pure asset buyout plans.
Let (λs, Es) be the equity plan picked by type s. Let (φs, Cs) be the corresponding asset
buyout plan (using the mapping in Lemma 2). Constrained-optimal bailout plans have the
following characteristics:
1. The size of the chosen plan is decreasing in bank quality; that is, λs, Es, φs, and Cs
are all decreasing in s.
2. Overcapitalization: Except possibly for the highest type, banks are overcapitalized.
For pure equity injections (alternatively, asset buyouts), this is to say that Es > Eˆs
(alternatively, Cs > F − [(1− φ)Ls +Xs/(1− ps)]).
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3. For pure equity injections (alternatively, asset buyouts), the price paid by the bailout
agency per new share (share of the assets) is decreasing in the amount of capital
injected, Es (alternatively, Cs).
4. The amount of capital injected is larger for asset buyouts than for equity injections
(Cs > Es).
That both λs and Es (as well as φs and Cs) are decreasing in s follows from intersec-
tion point monotonicity. Intuitively, these results reflect that higher types need smaller
injections to overcome the debt overhang problem. The nonlinear pricing structure un-
der constrained-optimal bailout menus relates to the (piecewise) concavity of the share-
cash indifference curves. Concavity is a simple implication of the fact that an additional
dollar of new equity contributes a smaller and smaller share of the equity value as the
equity injection increases. More fundamentally, nonlinear pricing is a direct consequence
of constrained-optimality: Since lower quality banks need larger injections, larger injec-
tions will have to be associated with lower per unit prices, especially because constrained-
optimality implies that old equityholders are being kept to their status quo payoffs.
Overcapitalization is necessary so as to not oversubsidize higher types, since for an
injection that injects the exact amount that eliminates debt overhang for type s, a bank
of type s′ > s would be willing to give away a larger share (as illustrated in Figure 1).
A simple way to think about the result that more capital needs to be used in pure asset
buyout plans than in equivalent pure equity injection plans is that it is compensation for
the reduction in assets. In other words, more capital is needed to solve the debt overhang
problem when assets are reduced (but see also Section 5).
Our nonlinear pricing (decreasing price per share in the size of the bailout) illustrates
that any bailout plan that allows a bank to sell any quantity of assets or shares that
it wishes at a fixed price (or linear pricing) – possibly subject to an upper bound –
is fundamentally limited, as constrained-optimality is generally not achieved under such
plans. Linear pricing only works in the case of two types.14 Our analysis implies that,
14Using Figure 1 as an example, draw a straight line that is tangent to the indifference curves of both
types. The two points of tangency represent separating plans. Any other construction with linear pricing
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in general, linear schemes either confer excessive windfalls on bailed out shareholders or
result in underinvestment.
3.2 Example
Here, we present an example that illustrates the role of the indifference curve intersection
points in constructing constrained-optimal menus of bailout plans. The example also
highlights the overcapitalization and the nonlinear pricing structure that results from
constrained-optimal menus.
There are three types, all with F = 100, Hs = 120, Xs = 5, and Ls and ps as follows:
Type: s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
Ls 70 73.89 75
ps 0.5 0.55 2/3
Lˆs 80 85 90
where Lˆs is calculated from (11).
These parameter values satisfy (17) so that indifference curve intersection point mono-
tonicity holds. Constrained-optimal menus of bailout plans therefore exist. The intersec-
tion points of the indifference curves are as follows:
λ E
Types 2 and 3 0.59 22.89
Types 1 and 2 0.76 42.50
By the analysis above, a menu consisting of these intersection-point contracts will
achieve constrained-optimality. A feature of such a menu is that type 2 is, by construction,
indifferent between the two plans. As discussed above, the intersection points can also be
used to construct other menus consisting of three plans that strictly separate out the three
types. Using the mapping in Lemma 2, equivalent pure asset buyout plans, (φ, C), are:
(0.59, 68.70) and (0.76, 86.47), respectively.
is not possible. Using Figure 2, it is easy to see that this linear construction is not possible for more than
two types.
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Table 1 presents expected payoffs under these bailout plans to equityholders (with
and without making the interim investment) and the bailout agency (with the interim
investment). It also shows the gross subsidies to equity and debt holders, which are seen
to differ from the bailout agency’s payoff by the NPV of 5.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The example illustrates the two key characteristics of optimal bailout plans, namely
overcapitalization and nonlinear pricing. Overcapitalization can be seen from the fact that
the plans inject more capital than is necessary to overcome the debt overhang problem for
each type (Eˆs). The nonlinear pricing of the plans in Table 1 is illustrated in the table
below.15
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
We see that as the dilution, λ, or share of assets sold, φ, increases (moving from Plan 1
to Plan 2), the price per share (equity injection) or price per 100% of the assets (asset
buyout) falls. The low type prefers selling at the lower price because at the higher price
the total size of the cash injection is too small. Creditors would collect too much of the
aggregate date 2 payoff in the down state. The high price/low dilution plan preferred by
the high type dilutes the old shares of the low type by too much.
Finally, let us compare the outcome of the two-plan menus discussed above to that
of the kind of single-plan program studied by Philippon and Schnabl (2011). Specifically,
consider the single-plan program that induces all three types to invest that has the lowest
expected subsidy. From the geometry of the indifference curves,16 it is clear that the
single equity injection plan that induces all three types to invest at the lowest expected
subsidy is represented by the intersection point of types 1 and 3. In our example, this is
(λ = 2/3, E = 30.00). In comparison, for type 2, the λ that keeps old equityholders to the
status quo payoff is 67.88 when E = 30. Thus, the single plan essentially subsidizes type
15Recall that, normalizing the number of old shares to 1, under a pure equity injection the number of
new shares is λ/(1− λ) and the price per new share is E(1− λ)/λ. Under an asset buyout, the price per
100% of the assets is simply C/φ.
16See Figure 2 and the proof of Proposition 2.
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2 equityholders by 1.22 percentage points, in terms of the dilution in an equity injection.
In terms of amount, the subsidy is 0.42. This represents 8.33% of the NPV of the interim
investment. In contrast, with two plans, it is possible to keep equityholders to their status
quo, i.e., giving equityholders zero subsidy, as illustrated in Table 1. Across all types,
the total subsidy in the example in Table 1 is 35.08. The increase in total subsidies from
using the single plan is 1.19% of this. Larger differences across types will give increased
oversubsidization from the single plan.
4 Extensions
This subsection modifies the baseline model in three respects. In the first subsection, we
introduce public costs and benefits from a bailout as well as additional types that do not
need or warrant a bailout. In the second subsection, we consider variable costs to raising
bailout funds. The analysis focuses on equity injections. Unless otherwise specified, all
assumptions of the baseline model are maintained and the parameter values are such that
the monotonicity condition in Definition 1 holds.
4.1 Additional Types and Public Costs and Benefits
We start by introducing net public benefits of Ys that arise if the interim investment is
made, in addition to the NPV of Xs that accrues to the bank. This could result from, for
example, a reduction in the probability of a bank run and/or incremental economy-wide
NPV arising from the bank’s interim lending activity. Fixed costs of administrating a
bailout are netted out. Because Ys does not affect shareholders’ payoffs or participation
and incentive compatibility constraints, these public benefits do not affect the analysis
above. However, the size and sign of Ys may affect the extent to which a bailout is
desirable. Ys is assumed to increase in s.
Suppose now that some types should optimally not be bailed out because Xs+Ys ≤ 0.
Specifically, there is a type n such that Xs + Ys ≤ 0 if and only if s ≤ n. Constrained-
optimality now involves types s ≤ n not being bailed out. Consider a pure equity injection
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menu consisting of the S − n − 1 leftmost indifference curve intersection points (see Def-
inition 1 and Figure 2). By construction, all plans in the menu make the shareholders of
banks with type s ≤ n worse off. The menu thus shuts out types withXs+Ys ≤ 0, as these
types voluntarily choose not to get bailed out.17 Also by construction (by the same logic
as in Subsection 3.1), for s > n, banks pick plans that induce the interim investment and
leave equityholders to their status quo payoff. Hence, constrained-optimality is achieved.
Suppose next that there is no debt overhang problem for some types. Constrained-
optimality would now be achieved if these types are not bailed out, while banks facing a
debt overhang problem are bailed out with minimal net subsidies as before.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is t such that Xs ≥ (1− ps)(F − Ls) for all s > t and that
we have monotonicity of indifference curve intersection points (according to the formulas
in Definition 1).18 Suppose also that Xs + Ys > 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S.
19 If t > 1,
constrained-optimality is achieved by a menu consisting of the t − 1 intersection point
plans {(λ(s−1,s), E(s−1,s))}ts=2 as defined in Definition 1. If t = 1, a single-plan menu
{(λ1(E), E)} with E ≥ E
(1,2) implements constrained-optimality.
In other words, types that do not need a bailout can be locked out by not including plans
that are tailored for them. They do not take plans tailored for lower types as these dilute
equity too much.
These results show that it is straightforward to deal with the possibilities that some
banks do not warrant or need a bailout. Simply select the submenu (of intersection-
point plans) that only include the plans tailored for the intermediate types that need and
warrant bailouts. In particular, this means that the characteristics of constrained-optimal
plans described in Proposition 3 are robust to these possibilities.
17Xs + Ys ≤ 0 includes the possibility that Xs ≤ 0. In this case, the bank chooses not to make the
interim investment. So if Xs ≤ 0, we need to set Lˆs = Ls and therefore also Eˆs = F − Ls. Indifference
curves are still given by (13), and the analysis is as before.
18Note that for s > t, the underlying curves λs(E) that are implicit in Definition 1 no longer represent
the true indifference curves of these types. Still, it is these curves that our assumption here deals with.
19This is without loss of generality, since if there are types with Xs + Ys ≤ 0, redefine type s = 1 to be
the smallest type with Xs + Ys > 0 (and allow the index s to be nonpositive, to denote the cases where
Xs + Ys ≤ 0).
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4.2 Variable Costs to Raising Bailout Funds
It is sometimes argued that raising bailout funds involve variable deadweight costs. Such
costs might arise if the use of public funds crowds out other valuable spending. In this
subsection, we examine whether such variable costs affect our result that constrained-
optimality is achieved through a separating menu. All assumptions of the baseline model
are maintained. In addition, there are net benefits, excluding variable costs from raising
bailout funds, of Ys ≥ 0 from making the interim investment that are increasing in s. Here
we view Ys as including Xs.
Suppose therefore that there are public costs of kE from raising public funds of E to
bail out a bank, where k > 0 is a constant. The first issue we need to address is how to
incorporate these costs into the objective function of the bailout agency. The costs from
bailouts in our baseline model are subsidies to creditors and shareholders. But these are
redistributions rather than direct costs.20 Thus, we face a modelling decision as to how to
combine deadweight costs and subsidies. LettingW (B) denote the expected payoff to the
bailout agency from offering menu B, we proceed by assuming that the bailout agency’s
objective is to
max
B
W (B) = max
B
∑
S
qs
[
Ys1invest|Bs,s − kEs − hQs
]
, (18)
where h > 0 is a constant, and
Qs = Es −
λs
1− λs
ZBss (19)
is the net subsidy to claimholders of type s from bailout plan Bs, as it equals the difference
between the bailout agency’s capital injection and the value of the shares it gets in return.21
Maximization is subject to bank participation and incentive compatibility constraints, as
before.
20The expectation of these contingent redistributions may lead to costs at some earlier, unmodelled
stage.
21An alternative specification involves replacing Qs by Qˆs, where is Qˆs = Qs − (1− ps)(F −Ls). That
is, Qˆs is the excess net subsidy, beyond what is given to creditors. This would not change our conclusions
substantively.
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For simplicity, assume now that there are only two types, s = 1, 2. Bailouts are
required for the interim investment to be made (by A3). We ask whether the bailout
agency is better off with a separating or pooling menu.22
Consider the (separating) menu
B
? ≡ {B?1 , B
?
2} ≡ {(λ
?
1, E
?
1), (λ
?
2, E
?
2)} ≡ {(λ
(1,2), E(1,2)), (λ2(F − Lˆ2), F − Lˆ2)}. (20)
By construction, given B?, type s picks plan B?s , both types invest, and net subsidies are
kept to the minimum.23 B? is the separating menu with the lowest total equity injection,
among those with minimal subsidies. We assume
A5. Under B?, for all s, Ys exceeds kEs + hQs.
Thus B? represents a separating contract where the bailout agency gains from bailing out
both types.
Define M ≡ q1E
?
1 + q2E
?
2 . This is the expected equity injection under B
?. Expected
deadweight costs are therefore kM .
Proposition 5 (a) If F − Lˆ1 ≥ M , the bailout agency is strictly better off with B
? than
any alternative one-plan menu. Suppose next that F − Lˆ1 < M . (b) Given h (and values
for the other exogenous parameters), there is k¯ > 0, bounded away from zero, such that
B
? is strictly better for the bailout agency than any one-plan menu as long as k < k¯. (c)
Given k (and values for the other exogenous parameters), there is h¯, bounded away from
∞, such that B? is strictly better for the bailout agency than any one-plan menu as long
as h > h¯.
For an intuition of this result, recall that underB?, both types make the interim investment
and subsidies are at their minimal theoretical value. Thus, to have any chance on improving
on B?, an alternative one-plan menu must reduce the expected equity injection, while
making both types invest.24 But if F − Lˆ1 ≥ M , this is impossible. If F − Lˆ1 < M ,
22A pooling menu is a one-plan menu that both types prefer over the alternative of no bailout.
23Strictly speaking, both types are indifferent between the two plans. To generate strict preferences,
modify B?s to be on λs(E) arbitrarily close to B
?
s (on the right) as it is defined in (20).
24Making only type 2 invest is optimally done with just offering B?1 . But this is strictly dominated by
B
?, by A5. Making only type 1 invest is possible only with E > E?1 , which makes the bailout agency
worse off than under B? conditional on either type and therefore also in expectation.
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a pooling plan that reduces equity injections is feasible. But since type 2’s indifference
curve lies above that of type 1 for E ∈ [F − Lˆ1,M ], this will necessarily increase subsidies
to type 2. The saving in deadweight costs will not offset the increase in subsidies if k is
sufficiently small or h sufficiently large.25
The proposition shows, under fairly general conditions, that separating menus that
induce both types to make the interim investment dominate pooling contracts (or one-
plan menus in general). While B? is not necessarily the optimal separating menu, the
proposition points to the robustness of our previous result regarding the separation of
types through a menu of plans that overcapitalize banks (except possibly the best type).
5 Equity Injections versus Asset Buyouts
Proposition 1 shows that equity injections and asset buyouts are equivalent in our baseline
model, in the sense that if constrained-optimality can be achieved with a menu of pure
equity injections, then it can also be achieved with a menu of pure asset buyouts, and vice
versa. In this section we discuss two potential caveats to this conclusion.
5.1 Bailout Size, Costs, and Leverage
Since constrained-optimal equity injections are smaller than equivalent asset buyouts
(Proposition 3), one might be tempted to conclude that variable costs to raising bailout
funds favor equity injections over asset buyouts. In our baseline model, subsequent capital
outlays are the same, given the 1-1 mapping described in Lemma 2. If the bailout agency
does not sell its shares or asset holdings after the bailout, it will have to inject λI = φI
of fresh capital at date 1 to fund the interim investment, either as a shareholder in the
bank or as a direct holder of assets. A simple intuition for why initial equity injections
are smaller is that since assets are reduced under asset buyouts, more capital needs to be
injected in order to deal with the debt overhang problem. However, a more fundamental
25This basic intuition remains valid if variable deadweight costs are nonlinear, though some details of
the formal argument would have to be modified.
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reason is that equity injections are implicitly levered; the equity that is being bought is
levered. In contrast, basic asset buyouts are unlevered transactions, and, as such, require
more upfront “public equity financing” than a plain equity injection.
This leads us to a standard Miller-Modigliani line of reasoning. In an asset buyout,
the bailout agency can replicate the implicit leverage of an equity injection by borrowing
against the assets it buys. The issue as to whether the smaller size of equity injections
is an advantage therefore centers around the risk adjusted cost of borrowing to finance
an asset bailout. Even if raising bailout funds through increased taxes or cutting public
spending involves variable costs, if the bailout agency can borrow on fair terms, the bailout
size itself is a matter of irrelevance. This conclusion regarding bailout size is not model
specific. The question as to whether borrowing by the bailout agency is cheap, expensive,
or fair can only be settled empirically.
5.2 An Alternative Model of Asset Buyouts
It has been argued by Paul Krugman26 and Philippon and Schnabl (2011), among others,
that an advantage to equity injections is that the bailout agency gets to share in the NPV
of new investments. But these authors do not consider the possibility of using menus to
separate out different types, including types that do not need or warrant bailouts. Allowing
for this, we have found that equity injections and asset buyouts may be equivalent. A
caveat to this conclusion, however, is that our analysis is based on the assumption that
investments follow the assets, thus giving the bailout agency a share of the upside from
new investments under asset buyouts too.
Consider now a variation of our baseline model where asset buyouts provide no par-
ticipation in interim investments to the bailout agency, because investment opportunities
follow the bank rather than the assets. This is to say that the available investments at the
interim date are not affected by the fraction φ of the assets-in-place that are transferred to
the bailout agency at date 0. So if the investment is taken, the (realized) payoff to date 1
equityholders is now max[wBs +X˜s+I−F, 0]−I . Thus, under an asset buyout, the bailout
26See, e.g.,“Gordon Does Good” (op ed) by Paul Krugman, New York Times, October 13, 2008.
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agency has no share in the upside from new investments. We ask whether this makes asset
buyouts worse than equity injections in terms of achieving constrained-optimality.
Given bailout plan B and type s, the investment condition now becomes
1invest|B,s = 1 iff E
[
max[wBs + X˜s + I − F, 0]
]
− I ≥ E
[
max[wBs − F, 0]
]
, (21)
where the expectation on the left hand side is taken over the joint distribution of ws and
X˜s, while on the right hand side it is taken over the marginal distribution of ws. The
expected net payoff to the original shareholders of a bank of type s under bailout plan B
in this new setup is thus
ZBs = (1− λ)
(
E
[
max[wBs + (X˜s + I)1invest|B,s − F, 0]
]
− I × 1invest|B,s
)
. (22)
This differs from the corresponding equation, (4), in the baseline model if φ > 0.
We focus on pure asset buyout plans. The modified setup has no effect on the analysis
of pure equity injections. Define
Cs ≡ F −
Xs
1− ps
− Ls
H − F + Xs
1−ps
H − Ls
=
F − Ls −
Xs
1−ps
H − Ls
H. (23)
Using (21) and a similar reasoning as in Section 3, we get that the indifference curve for
asset buyouts is given by27
φs(C) =


C
H
if C < Cs
(1−ps)(Ls−F )+Xs+C
As
if C ≥ Cs.
(24)
As before, constrained-optimality can be achieved if and only if the intersection points
of the indifference curves are monotonic. Under pure asset buyouts, the formula for the
intersection point of types s and s− 1 is
C(s−1,s) =
As−1[(1− ps)(Ls − F ) +Xs]− As[(1− ps−1)(Ls−1 − F ) +Xs−1]
As − As−1
. (25)
Intersection point monotonicity is that C(s−1,s) ≤ C(t−1,t) for s > t.
An example with three types is provided in Figure 3. This uses the same parameter
values as in Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2. Notice that intersection point monotonicity holds
27We sketch the derivation of (24) in the appendix. For simplicity, we modify A1 to I +Xmins ≥ F for
all s, in order to ensure full repayment to creditors in case the investment is taken.
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for the asset buyout indifference curves as they do for the equity injection ones. This is
thus an example of constrained-optimality being achievable with either equity injections
or asset buyouts. Even though asset buyouts involve no upside from new investments to
the bailout agency, they are just as good as equity injections in this example.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
However, this is not a general result. Table 3 tabulates the intersection points for
equity injections and asset buyouts in three scenarios. The first scenario corresponds to
Figures 2 and 3, where equity injections and asset buyouts are equivalent; intersection
points are monotonic (decreasing), implying that constrained-optimality can be achieved,
under either method. In the second scenario, the high type has a larger NPV from interim
investments and the middle type’s assets-in-place move closer to that of the high type. In
this scenario, equity injections are superior to asset buyouts. So here, upside to the bailout
agency is valuable. In the third scenario, the middle type’s interim investment becomes
as good as the high type’s, but the middle type’s assets-in-place moves closer to that of
the low type. In this scenario, asset buyouts are superior. So here, upside to the bailout
agency is damaging.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
To get an intuition for these results, let us focus on the middle type, since the high and
low types can always be separated from each other (as illustrated in Figure 1 for equity
injections). In Scenario 2, the middle type looks more like the bad type with respect to
its interim investments and more like the good type with respect to its assets-in-place.
Because of the high upside from new investments to the good type, this type is willing to
sell its assets-in-place relatively cheaply; that is, its indifference curve shifts up (relative
to Scenario 1). This makes it harder to separate out the middle type, especially because
the middle type is close to the good type with respect to the value of its assets-in-place.
This effect is more pronounced the more of the upside the good type can keep, which is
under asset buyouts (when investments follow the bank rather than the assets). Thus,
asset buyouts work less well when the middle type is close to the good type with respect
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to the value of assets-in-place and close to the bad type with respect to the NPV of
interim investments. The upside from new investments to the bailout agency offered by
equity injections is good in this scenario because it turns up the screening intensity on the
interim investment, and this is where the biggest difference is between the middle and the
high type.
Scenario 3 is the reverse situation; the middle type looks like the good type with respect
to interim investments and like the bad type with respect to assets-in-place. In this case,
it is helpful to turn up the screening intensity on assets-in-place, leading asset buyouts to
dominate equity injections.
These examples illustrate that when investments follow the bank, there is no clear-cut
choice between equity injections and asset buyouts. Upside to the bailout agency may be
good in terms of achieving constrained-optimality, but it can also be damaging, depending
on which element screening is needed more; assets-in-place or interim investments. This
also suggests that using warrants to try to obtain more upside to the bailout agency, as
suggested by Philippon and Schnabl (2011), is not necessarily optimal when one allows
for screening through menus.
6 Policy Choices and Concluding Remarks
The main results of importance for economic policy emerging from our analysis are the
following. When banks have troubled assets, having potential future values strictly below
their debt cum deposit obligations, and they are heterogeneous on multiple dimensions –
here their probabilities of default and losses given default – it is nevertheless feasible to
structure a bailout program which minimizes the implied subsidies to the equityholders
of different, and privately informed, bank types, holding their payoffs at the same level
as their status quo equity values in the absence of such bailouts. This can be done,
under the conditions spelled out in Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 above, using separating
menus of either equity injection, or asset buyout menus, which induce self-selection among
heterogeneous bank types. Such optimal menus of bailout plans involve nonlinear pricing,
whereby the price per share (or per unit of asset) is decreasing in the size of the bailout.
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Furthermore, quite robustly, with heterogeneous losses given default that covary posi-
tively with likelihoods of default across banks, such menus necessarily induce overcapital-
ization – cash injections over and above the minimal amounts needed to overcome debt
overhang – at weaker banks. The extent of such overcapitalization, and thus the degree to
which the bailout agency must acquire equity stakes in the bailed out banks, increases as
the quality of the bank declines, in terms of both its likelihood of default and loss given
default. In addition, under an equity injection based bailout plan, weaker banks are left
with lower inside equity stakes for their prior shareholders. This is not the case with asset
buyout based bailout plans, in which prior equity holders retain full ownership stakes in
the assets remaining with the bank.
We also find that equity injections involve lower cash outlays by the bailout agency
than asset buyouts. This is a result of the implicit leverage the bailout agency buys into
with an equity injection. This may be of importance if there are social costs associated
with raising government funding. However, if the bailout agency can borrow on fair terms
in the market against the assets it takes on in an asset buyout, the initial cash outlay
is not important, as such. In this case, in our baseline model where interim investment
opportunities are reduced in an asset buyout, equity injections and asset buyouts are
equivalent, in the sense that if it is possible to achieve constrained optimality with one
method, it is possible to do so with the other one as well.
More generally, the features described above of the two types of bailout programs
may impinge on policy choices over these. The lower share of inside equity under equity
injections, as compared with asset buyouts, may ill serve banks’ incentives to monitor
the quality of their future investments, since government capital would bear some or even
much of the costs of future losses arising from such lax monitoring. On the other hand,
equity injections have an advantage if raising bailout funds involve a social cost. The
optimal solution may depend on the interplay between the social costs, if any, of raising
bailout funds and the losses, if any, arising from reduced inside holdings.
In an extension to our baseline model, where interim investment opportunities are not
reduced in an asset buyout, we find that the fundamental irrelevance result in our baseline
model breaks down, without the need to introduce social costs from raising bailout funds
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or agency costs. Our analysis of this alternative model indicate that equity injections
do a better screening job than asset buyouts when bank types are differentiated more by
the NPV of their future investment opportunities. But if banks are differentiated more
by their assets-in-place, then asset buyouts may be better than equity injections. Thus,
upside to the bailout agency can be damaging as well as value enhancing. In this version
of our model, equity injections and asset buyouts are seen to perform different functions
and the preference for one or the other bailout program, or a mixture of the two, depends
on the specific circumstances of individual banks.
While we have included the possibility of public benefits to bailouts in our analysis,
we have not explicitly modelled a system-wide bailout where cross-spillover effects make
banks’ incentive compatibility constraints dependent on the outcome for other banks. As
emphasized by Gorton and Huang (2004) and more recently by Tirole (2012), this may be
important in a systemic crisis. Incorporating such effects in our screening model of bank
bailouts with equity injections and asset buyouts would be an interesting avenue for future
research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
This follows from (3), using A1 – A3. Details: For an equity injection, (λ,E), (3) becomes
psE
[
max[Hs + E + X˜s + I − F, 0]|Hs
]
+ (1− ps)E
[
max[Ls + E + X˜s + I − F, 0]|Ls
]
− I
≥ psmax[Hs + E − F, 0] + (1− ps)max[Ls + E − F, 0].
(26)
Using A1 and A2, this reduces to
ps [Hs + E − F ] + (1− ps)
[
Ls + E +
Xs
1−ps
− F
]
≥ ps [Hs + E − F ] + (1− ps)max[Ls + E − F, 0],
which, using A3, is true if and only if E ≥ Eˆs. 2
Proof of Lemma 2
Let us refer to the mapping φ = λ and C = (1−λ)E+λF asM. Equivalence of investment
decision: By (3), under a pure equity injection, the interim investment is made if and only
if (26) holds. The corresponding condition under a pure asset buyout is
psE
[
max[Hs(1− φ) + C + (X˜s + I)(1− φ)− F, 0] | Hs
]
+(1− ps)E
[
max[Ls(1− φ) + C + (X˜s + I)(1− φ)− F, 0]|Ls
]
− I(1− φ)
≥ psmax[Hs(1− φ) + C − F, 0] + (1− ps)max[Ls(1− φ) + C − F, 0]
(27)
The mappingM makes all corresponding terms of (26) and (27) equivalent (to a factor of
1− φ). Thus, the investment condition is equivalent. As are realized payoffs. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
From the expression for the indifference curve, λs(E) for a bank of type s, equation (13), we
see that the indifference curve changes functional form and shape as E goes from represent-
ing undercapitalization, E < Eˆs, to overcapitalization, E > Eˆs. It is straightforward to
verify that (a) λs(E) is strictly increasing and, on each region, strictly concave; (b) λ
′
s(E)
rises strictly as E enters the overcapitalization region; and (c) λ′s(E) >
d
dE
E/(H +E−F )
for E > Eˆs.
From (13), we also see that λ1(E) and λ2(E) coincide for E ≤ Eˆs. Thus, λ2(E) > λ1(E)
immediately to the right of Eˆ2, by observation (b) above. Furthermore, by observation
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(c), λ2(E) > λ1(E) for all E ∈ (Eˆ2, Eˆ1]. To establish the proposition, we therefore need
to show that λ2(E) and λ1(E) intersect once and only once for E > Eˆ1.
Observe now that on the overcapitalization region, E > Eˆs, λ
′
s(E) is strictly decreasing
in ps. Therefore, λ2(E) and λ1(E) can at most intersect once. Now, inspection of (13)
shows that for sufficiently large E, we have λ2(E) < λ1(E), since p2 is strictly larger than
p1. Thus, since the two curves are continuous, there is a unique point of intersection.
Straightforward calculations using (13) show that the two curves intersect at E as given
by (16), and at this point, λ1 and λ2 are as given by (15). 2
Proof of Theorem 1
The statement that constrained-optimality can be achieved if and only if monotonicity
of indifference curve intersection points holds follows from preceding results and the dis-
cussion in the text (it is straightforward to formalize and extend the discussion regarding
intersection monotonicity in the text to an arbitrary number S of types). We need to show
that indifference curve intersection point monotonicity holds if and only if (17) holds for
all s = 2, . . . , S − 1. To this end, pick any s ∈ {2, . . . S − 1}. Monotonicity of indifference
curve intersection points implies that E(s,s+1) < E(s−1,s), or by (16),
F −
psAˆs−1 − ps−1Aˆs
ps − ps−1
> F −
ps+1Aˆs − psAˆs+1
ps+1 − ps
. (28)
Using Aˆs = psH + (1 − ps)Lˆs (and the analogous expressions for s − 1 and s + 1), (28)
simplifies to (17). 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Focus first on equity injections. (1) This is immediate from Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
(2) Let s < S. By Theorem 1 and the associated discussion, Es ≥ E
(s−1,s) > Eˆs, where
the last inequality follows from Proposition 2. For s = S, the discussion immediately
preceding Theorem 1 shows that we can have ES = EˆS.
28 (3) Normalizing the number of
old shares to 1, under a pure equity injection plan, the number of new shares is λs/(1−λs).
28Strictly speaking, all types are indifferent between the status quo and (λ, E) = (λS(EˆS), EˆS), even
though this does not solve the debt overhang problem for any other type than s = S. This can be dealt
with by for example not including this plan in the menu, in which case the highest type will have to be
overcapitalized as well.
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Thus, the price per new share under a pure equity injection plan is Es(1−λs)/λs. This is
decreasing in s since both λs and Es are decreasing in s. Note that (1)-(3) can be extended
to pure asset buyouts by using the mapping in Lemma 2. (4) This follows directly from
the mapping in Lemma 2. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
By Theorem 1 and the associated analysis, the offered menu implements constrained-
optimality for the subset of types that face a debt overhang problem, i.e., types s′ ≤ t.
We need to show that type s > t, that does not face a debt overhang problem, will not
take any of the plans. Pick any s > t. The status quo payoff is (using an ∗ to denote the
absence of a debt overhang problem)
Z∗s = ps (Hs − F ) + (1− ps)
(
Ls +
Xs
1− ps
− F
)
= ps(Hs − F ) + (1− ps)(Lˆs − F ). (29)
Thus, the share-cash indifference curve becomes
λ∗s(E) = 1−
ps(H − F ) + (1− ps)(Lˆs − F )
ps(H + E − F ) + (1− ps)(Lˆs + E − F )
. (30)
A comparison with λs(E) as given by (13) shows that λ
∗
s(E) < λs(E) for E ≥ F −
Lˆs. Furthermore, letting s
′ ≤ t, by the monotonicity of indifference curve intersection
points, λs(E
(s′−1,s′)) < λ(s
′−1,s′). Hence type s would be worse off by accepting any of the
intersection point plans on offer. 2
Proof of Proposition 5
Let BA = {(λA, EA)} be an alternative one-plan menu. We start by showing that
W (BA) ≥ W (B?) requires EA ∈ [F − Lˆ1, E
?
1). To this end, observe first that under
B
? both types take the interim investment and Ys − kE
?
s − hQs > 0, s = 1, 2. Further-
more, by construction, B?2 is the constrained-optimal plan conditional on s = 2, since
E?2 = F − Lˆ2 is the smallest equity injection that induces the interim investment for a
bank of type 2, and gross subsidies are at their minimal level, (1 − p2)(F − L2). Thus,
improving on B? requires reducing the equity injection taken by type 1 while inducing the
interim investment. This requires
EA ∈ [F − Lˆ1, E
?
1), (31)
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which we henceforth assume.
Next, we argue that W (BA) ≥ W (B?) also requires λA = λ1(E
A). Now, if λA >
λ1(E
A), type 1 will optimally pick no plan. This strictly reduces utility to the bailout
agency relative to under B?, since by assumption, Y1 − kE1 − hQ1 > 0 under B
?
1 . (There
is an additional loss of utility to the bailout agency from type 2 not being bailed out with
B?2). If λ
A < λ1(E
A), type 1 will pick BA, but subsidies are strictly increased relative to
having λA = λ1(E
A). Thus, we must have
λA = λ1(E
A), (32)
which we henceforth assume.
Offered BA with (31) and (32), both types take the plan and make the interim invest-
ment. For type 1, net subsidies are the same as underB?. But for type 2, net subsidies are
strictly higher, since λ2(E
A) > λ1(E
A) = λA for EA ∈ [F − Lˆ1, E
?
1). Therefore, changing
the menu from B? to BA, brings about a strict increase in expected net subsidies. At the
same time, expected deadweight costs change by
k[q1(E
A − E?2)− q2(E
?
1 − E
A)] = k
[
EA −M
]
.
Thus, if EA ≥ M , expected deadweight costs also increase, implying that the bailout
agency is worse off. Hence, if F − Lˆ1 ≥ M , the utility to the bailout agency falls regardless
of k or h. This establishes (a).
Suppose next that F − Lˆ1 < M . Now, W (B
A) ≥W (B?) requires EA < M , which we
henceforth assume. The maximum expected reduction in equity injections occurs when
EA is at its minimum, F − Lˆ1, and equals
G =M − (F − Lˆ1).
Denote the increase in subsidy costs resulting from type 2 picking BA rather than B?2 by
H(EA). Define
H = q2 inf{H(E
A)|EA ∈ [F − Lˆ1,M)}.
Note that H is bounded away from 0 since λ2(E) > λ1(E) on [F − Lˆ1,M ]. (b) follows by
setting k¯ = H/G, since for k < H/G the reduction in expected deadweight costs is less
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than the increase in expected subsidy costs. (c) follows directly from the observation that
H is strictly increasing in h with limh→∞H =∞ and from the fact that G is bounded.2
Sketch of derivation of (24).
Under a pure asset buyout plan, (φs, C), (21) becomes
psE
[
max[Hs(1− φs) + C + X˜s + I − F, 0] | Hs
]
+(1− ps)E
[
max[Ls(1− φs) + C + X˜s + I − F, 0] | Ls
]
− I
≥ psmax[Hs(1− φs) + C − F, 0] + (1− ps)max[Ls(1− φs) + C − F, 0].
(33)
Assume (which will have to be verified) that Hs(1 − φs) + C − F ≥ 0. Using this, (33)
reduces to
Ls(1− φs) +
Xs
1− ps
+ C − F ≥ max[Ls(1− φs) + C − F, 0]
which holds whenever C ≥ F −Ls(1−φs)−Xs/(1− ps). In turn, after some algebra, this
yields (23) and (24). It is straightforward to verify that Hs(1− φs) + C − F ≥ 0 when φs
is given by (24). 2
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Table 1 Examples of Constrained-Optimal Menus of Bailout Plans: Equity Injections versus Asset Buyouts
Note that Hs = H = 120 for all types. The net total subsidy is the Total Subsidy less the NPV of the interim investment, Xs.
Type Prob Ls Xs Lˆs Eˆs Expected Payoff to Old Equity If Invest, Expected. . .
low Status Bailout Bailout Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy Payoff
Quo Not invest Invest Old Equity Debt Total Bailout Ag.
Panel A: Plan 1. Equity injection, λ = 0.59 and E = 22.86. OR Asset buyout, φ = 0.59 and C = 68.70.
1 (worst) 0.5 70 5 80 20 10 8.70 9.28 -0.72 15 14.28 -9.28
2 (medium) 0.45 73.89 5 85 15 11 9.57 11 0 11.75 11.75 -6.75
3 (best) 0.33 75 5 90 10 13.33 11.59 13.33 0 8.33 8.33 -3.33
Panel B: Plan 2. Equity injection, λ = 0.76 and E = 42.50. OR Asset buyout, φ = 0.76 and C = 86.47.
1 (worst) 0.5 70 5 80 20 10 8.82 10 0 15 15 -10
2 (medium) 0.45 73.89 5 85 15 11 9.82 11 0 11.75 11.75 -6.75
3 (best) 0.33 75 5 90 10 13.33 11.18 12.35 -0.98 8.33 7.35 -2.35
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Table 2 Example of Nonlinear Pricing: Equity Injections and Asset Buyouts
Plans 1 and 2 are as defined in Table 1.
Plan 1 Plan 2
Small injection Large injection
Equity injection, Price per new share 15.89 13.41
Asset buyout, Price per 100% of assets 116.44 113.77
Preferred by Highest type Lowest type
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Table 3 Examples of Asset Buyouts versus Equity Injections when Investments Fol-
low the Bank
The table presents the intersection points of share-cash indifference curve for pure as-
set buyout and pure equity injections in three scenarios. Common parameter values
are: H = 120, F = 100, L1 = 70, L3 = 75, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.67, and X1 = 5. The
other parameters vary across scenarios. A method is preferred if it allows for a sepa-
rating menu. The condition for this is that the intersection points are monotonically
decreasing in type. For asset buyouts, the condition is: C(1,2) > C(2,3), as calculated
from (25). For equity injections, the condition is: E(1,2) > E(2,3), as calculated from
(16).
Scenario and Parameters Intersection Points
Preferred Method L2 p2 X2 X3 C
(1,2) C(2,3) E(1,2) E(2,3)
1. Either one 73.89 0.55 5 5 82.65 65.72 42.50 22.86
2. Equity injection 74.5 0.60 5 6 77.06 96.40 34.00 31.00
3. Asset buyout 71 0.60 6 6 87.41 76.90 32.00 35.00
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Figure 1: Share-Cash Indifference Curves for Two Types
20 40 60 80
E
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0.4
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0.8
Λ
Type 1
Type 2
The indifference curves represent (λ,E) combinations that keep existing equity to its
status quo expected payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows:
H = 120, F = 100, Lˆ1 = 80, Lˆ2 = 90, p1 = 0.5 and p3 = 2/3. Constrained-optimality
is achieved, for example, by choosing the plan represented by the intersection point
(λ = 2/3, E = 30) of the two curves. Any combination of two plans designed as follows
will also work: Plan 1 – any point on Type 2’s indifference curve with 10 < E < 30.
Plan 2 – any point on Type 1’s indifference curve with E > 30.
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Figure 2: Share-Cash Indifference Curves for Three Types:
Constrained-Optimality Achievable
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
E
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Λ
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
The indifference curves represent (λ,E) combinations that keep existing equity to its
status quo expected payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows:
H = 120, F = 100, Lˆ1 = 80, Lˆ2 = 85, Lˆ3 = 90, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55, and p3 = 2/3.
Intersection point monotonicity is satisfied. The indifference curves of Types 2 and 3
intersect at (λ = 0.59, E = 22.86), while the indifference curves of Types 1 and 2 inter-
sect at (λ = 0.76, E = 42.5). The curves coincide for E ≤ 10. Constrained-optimality
can be achieved, for example, by offering a menu of the two plans corresponding to
these two intersection points.
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Figure 3: Indifference Curves under Asset Buyouts when Interim
Investment Opportunities Follow the Bank
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The indifference curves represent (φ, C) combinations that keep existing equity to its
status quo expected payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: H =
120, F = 100, L1 = 70, L2 = 73.89, L3 = 75, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.55, p3 = 2/3, and Xs = 5
for all s. The indifference curves of Types 2 and 3 intersect at (φ = 0.76, E = 82.65),
while the indifference curves of Types 1 and 2 intersect at (φ = 0.59, E = 65.72).
Thus intersection point monotonicity is satisfied. The curves coincide for C ≤ 26.67.
Constrained-optimality can be achieved, for example, by offering a menu of the two
plans corresponding to the two intersection points.
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